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Abstract
Recent work has shown the tremendous vulnerability to adversarial samples that
are nearly indistinguishable from benign data but are improperly classified by
the deep learning model. Some of the latest findings suggest the existence of
adversarial attacks may be an inherent weakness of these models as a direct
result of its sensitivity to well-generalizing features in high dimensional data.
We hypothesize that data transformations can influence this vulnerability since a
change in the data manifold directly determines the adversary’s ability to create
these adversarial samples. To approach this problem, we study the effect of
dimensionality reduction through the lens of adversarial robustness. This study
raises awareness of the positive and negative impacts of five commonly used data
transformation techniques on adversarial robustness. The evaluation shows how
these techniques contribute to an overall increased vulnerability where accuracy is
only improved when the dimensionality reduction technique approaches the data’s
optimal intrinsic dimension. The conclusions drawn from this work contribute to
understanding and creating more resistant learning models.
1 Introduction
There is a major concern on the immense fragility in neural networks when given a varying size set
of adversarial samples, or imperceptibly perturbed inputs [Biggio and Roli, 2018, Su et al., 2019,
Elsayed et al., 2018, Huang et al., 2017]. To address this issue, many pioneering works have risen to
increase the models’ robustness or to maintain accurate prediction ability with the existence of these
adversarial examples [Biggio and Roli, 2018, Ilyas et al., 2019, Elsayed et al., 2018, Hendrycks et al.,
2019a, Goodfellow et al., 2018, Xu et al., 2017, Crecchi et al., 2019, Lee et al., 2019, Hendrycks
et al., 2019b,c]. Previous work has proposed a variety of explanations for the intense vulnerability
that these classifiers have to these imperceptibly perturbed inputs. Szegedy et al. [2013] initially
argued the existence of low-probability adversarial “pockets” that an adversary can take advantage
of during the creation of their samples. Goodfellow et al. [2014] made the connection between the
ease of generating adversarial examples due to the linear nature of deep neural networks. Feinman
et al. [2017] classified three cases where adversarial samples lie: (1) when the adversarial example is
far away from the data manifold,1 (2) when the submanifolds corresponding to different labels have
pockets that allow the adversarial example to be on a submanifold of the wrong label further away
from the classification boundary, and (3) when the adversarial example is near two submanifolds and
close to the decision boundary. Most recently, Ilyas et al. [2019] argued that vulnerabilities arise due
1In mathematics, a data manifold is the geometry of the data which contains a topological space that locally
resembles the Euclidean space near each data value. Each of these topological spaces per data value corresponds
to an n-dimensional manifold with a neighborhood that is homeomorphic to the Euclidean space.
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to a model’s well-generalizability of features in high dimensional data. However, the fundamental
cause of the vulnerability has not been proven. As a result, the goal has been to disentangle the model
to achieve robustness, either through standard regularization methods [Ilyas et al., 2019, Chun et al.,
2020] or pre/post-processing of network input/outputs [Hendrycks et al., 2019a,c]. However, there
is an ever-growing list of pre-processing techniques used in machine learning which are not used
for increasing robustness [Tsai et al., 2019, Naranjo and Santos, 2019, Cohen et al., 2020, Aleman
et al., 2018, Braten and Kraemer, 2018, Huang and Zhou, 2019, Alemany et al., 2019]. Since we
hypothesize that any data transformation directly impacts the adversary’s ability to create adversarial
samples due to manipulations in the data manifold, we focus on how five [Shlens, 2014, Golay and
Kanevski, 2017, Bramer and Devedic, 2004, Chmielewski et al., 2015, Klinker, 2011] widely-used
data transformation techniques affect the robustness of neural networks.
With this work, we introduce the positive and negative side effects that applying five frequently
used dimensionality reduction techniques may have on a recurrent neural network given the Carlini
& Wagner l∞ [Carlini and Wagner, 2017a] evasion attack. To formally explain the difference in
robustness, we propose that the inherent vulnerability does not solely stem from the ability of the
neural network to generalize the features of high dimensionality data but also the increased capacity
of the adversary to more efficiently2 attack as the dimensionality of the data strays from the optimal
intrinsic dimension. Lastly, evaluation results identify that the component-based dimensionality
reduction technique, Principal Component Analysis (PCA), increases accuracy robustness by up to
24.39% only when reduced to the intrinsic dimension. Feature selection and trend extraction methods
allow the adversary to employ more efficient evasion attacks for all evaluated perturbation budgets
resulting in up to 65.85% increase in attack success. Additionally, we identify all five dimensionality
reduction techniques reduce the precision robustness from 0.33 to at most 0.11 when the perturbation
budget is above 0.68 with only PCA improving precision robustness from 0.48 to at most 0.84 when
the perturbation budget is below 0.68.
2 Related Work
Adversarial machine learning has a considerable amount of prior work, so we focus on only the most
related papers to our work in this section. Specifically, we briefly review previous works with defenses
against adversarial attacks in the field of machine learning and, specifically, how dimensionality
reduction has been used for robustness.
Robustness Due to the unknown fundamental and theoretical reasoning behind the immense
vulnerability, various works attempt to reduce the impact of adversarial attacks, as in [Ilyas et al.,
2019, Hendrycks et al., 2019a,c, Xu et al., 2017]. These techniques increase robustness by modifying
the input such that the impact of gradient-based attacks are reduced, either through adversarial
pre-training [Hendrycks et al., 2019a,c], feature squeezing [Xu et al., 2017], or identifying and
removing the least “robust features” which contribute the most to a model’s vulnerability [Ilyas et al.,
2019]. Unfortunately, adversarial attacks are still resilient. Ilyas et al. [2019] claimed that this is
due to the theoretical foundational problem in machine learning which is built on the assumption
that the training data accurately and adequately represents the underlying and abstracted phenomena
through the learning process. As a result, given an adversarial sample, even with added robustness,
the fundamental problem remains. Recent work has proposed that it is due to the high dimensionality3
traditional abstraction techniques provide during training Mahloujifar et al. [2019], Crecchi et al.
[2019], Shafahi et al. [2019], Ilyas et al. [2019].
Dimensionality reduction For decades, data dimensionality is often referred to as a “curse” due to
the substantial computational complexity yielding difficulties when abstracting and understanding
properties in data that do not occur in lower-dimensional data [Bingham and Mannila, 2001, Van
Der Maaten et al., 2009]. Dimensionality reduction is the transformation of high-dimensional data into
a significant representation of low dimensionality. As a result, it is not uncommon for dimensionality
2A more efficient attack consists of the adversary being able to induce inaccurate results using a "harder-to-
detect" reduced perturbation budget.
3Highly dimensionality of a model is not only correlated to the model but also the dataset being used Su et al.
[2019].
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Figure 1: Machine learning pipeline in the presence of a white-box evasion adversarial attack. Data
transformations are completed before the training stage; therefore, at the time of the attack, the
adversary knows and uses the distribution of this processed data.
reduction techniques, such as Principle Component Analysis, to be used in various fields, such as data
analytics or machine learning pre-processing, to improve upon these burdens [Cheng and Lu, 2018].
Dimensionality reduction has naturally influenced the field of adversarial machine learning due to
the connection between adversarial vulnerability in deep learning and the high dimensionality of
data. Xu et al. [2017] proposed feature squeezing for images in the input space that effectively
forces the data to lie in a low dimensional manifold. Hendrycks and Gimpel [2016] and Crecchi
et al. [2019] both proposed detection methods which take advantage of dimensionality reduction
techniques as their primary defense component. Meanwhile, Bhagoji et al. [2018] and Bhagoji et al.
[2017] proposed a defense that uses the component-based PCA and implies that incorporating PCA
as pre-processing for the training data enhances the resilience of a fully-connected neural network.
However, Carlini and Wagner [2017b] showed how the previously described techniques [Hendrycks
and Gimpel, 2016, Bhagoji et al., 2017] were not consistent defenses. Against Bhagoji et al. [2017],
they were able to show how using the dimensionality reduction technique, PCA, in the training
data did not increase the robustness of a convolutional neural network, only the fully-connected
network. Additionally, against Hendrycks and Gimpel [2016], they presented the argument that their
proposed method only worked on the evaluated dataset MNIST due to the main difference between
the adversarial and benign samples being the border-pixels since they are nearly always zero in the
benign data. However, their defense was not effective when tested with another image dataset, CIFAR.
Observing these inconsistencies, we hypothesize that widely-used linear data transformations such as
component-based reduction, feature selection, and trend extraction techniques can negatively and
directly impact the adversary’s ability to attack the model efficiently.
3 Learning Model
Generally, data pre-processing includes processes such as data cleaning, normalization, transforma-
tion, feature extraction, selection, and is the step done before training [Kotsiantis et al., 2006]. Figure
1 shows the machine learning pipeline considered in this work. In the following subsections, we
formally describe the model used for training and the data transformation techniques evaluated in
this work. Note that we did not implement any defenses as our goal for this work is to explore the
impact of these techniques for small perturbation budgets that are difficult to detect using the current
state-of-the-art defenses [Tjeng et al., 2019]. Considering the attack success rate with incorporated
defenses and data transformation techniques is left for future work.
3.1 Standard Training
We study multi-class classification, where input-label pairs (x, l) ∈ X × Z+ are sampled from a
distribution D given a dataset, or input space, X . We model data in a high-dimensional space with
embedded class-specific low-dimensional manifolds. Each training point (or input-label pair) belongs
to one of N different classes. The classifier’s goal is to predict the class to which, given a new data
point x, it will correctly predict the class l to which the new point belongs. Specifically, the class
l is selected using the softmax function on the output of the model. More formally, the classifier’s
objective is to learn C : X → Z+, or in other words, predicting l ∈ L ⊂ Z+ given a value x ∈ X
where |L| = N .
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There are various features mapping from the input space, X , each of these features are real numbers
such that the features, F = {f : X → R}. The feature values are normalized to (1) make the
definitions throughout the models (including the attack models) scale-invariant and, (2) to aid in the
learning process [Ilyas et al., 2019, Alemany et al., 2019]. Standard training occurs by performing
minimization on a loss function Lθ(x, l) over the input-label pairs (x, l) from the training set. With
this work, we aim to explore a variety of linear data transformation techniques which affect the
risk, E(x,l)∼D[Lθ(x, l)]. Just recently, this risk has been shown to have robustness bounds based
the intrinsic4 properties on the underlying data distribution D [Zhang et al., 2020]. Additionally,
codimension5 has been defined to strongly contribute to the pervasiveness of adversarial examples
with no relation to the intrinsic properties of data [Khoury and Hadfield-Menell, 2018]. We specifically
focus on the minimization of the codimension by aiming for the intrinsic dimensionality of data as
the input (x, l) and its impact on the model robustness.
3.2 Data Transformation Techniques
Dimensionality reduction transforms a dataset X with dimensionality d to a new dataset X ′ with
dimensionality d′ such that the geometry of the data is maintained as much as possible. However,
this is under the assumption that the geometry of the data manifold, or the intrinsic dimensionality
di of the dataset X , is known. Such manifold is generally twisted and curved with non-uniformly
distributed points on it, making the identification of the intrinsic dimensionality a challenging task
specific to each individual dataset [Facco et al., 2017]. Therefore, dimensionality reduction is solved
by assuming certain properties of the data in practice, such as the intrinsic dimension based on the
variance of X . In this section, we describe and their potential impacts on a data manifold with the
resulting robustness impacts in Section 5.
Note that our comparative review includes frequently used component-based reduction, feature
selection, and trend extraction transformation techniques for data transformations, it is not exhaustive.
We have strictly focused on widely-used linear data transformation techniques and their impact on
the intrinsic dimension of data. Future work can be focused on non-linear dimensionality reduction
techniques. We keep both works separate as we hypothesize that non-linear transformations impact
the complexity of data manifolds in different ways than linear ones.
Component-based reduction Principal component analysis (PCA) is by far one of the more popu-
lar unsupervised tools due to its simple, non-parametric method for extracting relevant information
from overwhelming datasets [Shlens, 2014]. PCA performs dimensionality reduction by embedding
the data into a linear subspace of lower dimensionality by maximizing the amount of variance in the
model [Van Der Maaten et al., 2009]. In other words, it constructs a low-dimensional representation
of the data that describes as much of the variance in the data as possible, considering that the most
variant features are the ones that contain the most information. For brevity, we assume the reader
understands the mathematical background of PCA. For this work, we consider using 27%, 50%,
and 81% of the principal components to approximate the feature counts around the 25, 50, and
75 quartiles. We explore how the selected p in varying extremes can significantly change the data
manifold in diverse ways which impact robustness.
Feature selection Feature selection is a data transformation technique that has been used for
decades to represent particular relationships in data by eliminating features that may be irrelevant
or redundant [Dash and Liu, 1997]. These dimensionality reduction techniques select a subset of
features where the original class distribution is still approximated based on a varying set size of
heuristics used by different feature selection techniques. For this work, we have selected random
forest selection [Golay and Kanevski, 2017] and low variance selection [Bramer and Devedic, 2004]
due to their high usage for their low computational requirements.
Random forest selection has been shown to provide multivariate feature importance scores that are
relatively cheap to obtain and have successfully been applied to high dimensional data [Menze et al.,
2009]. This technique is an ensemble learner based on randomized decision trees and utilizes a
4The intrinsic dimensionality of data is the minimum number of parameters need to account for the observed
properties in the data [Van Der Maaten et al., 2009].
5Codimension is the difference between the dimension of the data manifold and the dimension of the
embedding space [Khoury and Hadfield-Menell, 2018].
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Figure 2: Boxplots to show the distribution of each feature from the MHealth (Mobile Health) Dataset
[Banos et al., 2015]. We can see 9 of the 22 of the features contribute most of the variance in the data
indicated by the height of each feature plot (approximately 84.8% of the total variance). More details
regarding the dataset are described in Section 5.1.
feature importance measure, known as the “Gini importance” [Golay and Kanevski, 2017]. The
features are selected if their importance measure is above a specified threshold. For this work, we
set the threshold to be the mean of all importance values, as it is standard in practice [Pedregosa
et al., 2011]. Low variance selection is a simple baseline approach to feature selection which removes
all features whose variance do not meet a specified threshold [Bramer and Devedic, 2004]. This
technique maximizes the variance in the model similar to PCA, however, there is no mapping onto a
lower dimensional space. Additionally, since the variance of each feature is calculated independently,
the relationship of features with the target variable is not considered in this feature selection technique
unlike random forest selection.
For this work, we selected the features that contributed 91.1% of the variance in the data, resulting in
a total of 11 features, as it is said to be the best hueristic to approximate the intrinsic dimension of a
dataset [Van Der Maaten et al., 2009]. Both of the feature selection techniques chose 9 overlapping
techniques and aligns with expectations since 9 features contributed most of the relevant information,
as shown in Figure 2. As a result, we expect their impact on data manifolds to be similar even with
their varying heuristics for feature selection.
Trend extraction Up-to-date works have focused on image recognition tasks concerning robustness,
but time series data is also highly used in machine learning applications. As a result, we have analyzed
the impact of data transformation techniques meant to extract trends in time series data, such as
candlesticks [Chmielewski et al., 2015] and exponential moving average [Klinker, 2011]. These
trend extraction techniques were selected as they are used in prediction tasks in areas such as the
economics/financial markets [Naranjo and Santos, 2019, Cohen et al., 2020], the Internet of Things
[Aleman et al., 2018, Braten and Kraemer, 2018], and object tracking [Huang and Zhou, 2019].
Although not typical dimensionality reduction techniques, we argue that these techniques affect the
data manifold by smoothing the trends, similarly to feature squeezing for image recognition [Xu
et al., 2017]. These trend extraction techniques do so by artificially reducing the distance between
temporally adjacent points that provide better estimation of their distance along the manifold [Rahimi
et al., 2007].
Candlestick data transformation converts each feature in F into a series of candlesticks. A single
candlesticks is a four-tuple containing the first value, last value, maximum, and minimum values a
time window of the time series data – referred to as the open, close, high, and low values, respectively
[Chmielewski et al., 2015]. The time window is defined from time t to time t+ c with a consecutive
candlestick starting at time t+c+1, and so on. All the candlesticks have an equally sized time window
of size c. The values in a candlestick are normalized as in [Chmielewski et al., 2015]. Once the dataset
X of dimension d×n gets transformed to X ′ of dimension 4d× nc . The overall dimensionality of X
is then only reduced if c ≥ 4. For our evaluation, we only consider the case where the dimensionality
is reduced. Exponential moving average (EMA) creates a series of averages of different subsets for
each feature in F . The EMA for a particular time t is calculated as x′(t) = αx(t) + (1−α)x′(t− 1)
where x′(t) and x(t) are the new EMA and original values at time t for a particular feature in F , and
α is a smoothing factor in (0, 1] [Klinker, 2011]. This smoothing factor is calculated as α = 2c+1
where c is the assigned time window as previously described. In this case, the dimensionality of the
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data is not necessarily reduced, however, the trends are extracted for a smoother manifold resulting in
X effectively forced to lie in a lower dimensional manifold [Xu et al., 2017].
For this work, to ensure we are similarly comparing both trend extraction techniques, both were
assigned the same value of c = 20 for the time window. This value was a selected hyperparameter
that would not reduce the dimensionality of the dataset enough to hinder the model accuracy for
the candlestick technique but would cause a significant change to the feature trends given the EMA
technique.
4 Threat Model
As per Carlini et al. [2019], in this section we define the adversary’s knowledge, capabilities, and
goals to ensure analysis for worst-case robustness. Adversarial examples can be present in white-box
and black-box threat models. In this paper, we use a white-box attack where the adversary has full
access to the trained neural network model, the defense used, along with the data distribution at test
time [Athalye et al., 2018]. We consider this attack because white-box attacks are more powerful than
black-box attacks, as a white-box attack can reach a 100% success rate. Additionally, we consider
evasion attacks where the adversaries can attack only during model deployment, meaning that they
can only tamper with the input data after the deep learning model is trained. We utilize evasion
attacks rather than poisoning attacks in this work because, even though poisoning attacks are effective,
they require that the attacker access training data while being used to train a victim model. This
assumption is often unrealistic, so poisoning attacks are not too severe against machine learning
applications [Kwon et al., 2018].
Adversarial Examples Given a data point x and a classifier C, an adversarial sample x′ satisfies
two properties: (1) D(x, x′) <  for some distance metric D, and (2) C(x) 6= C(x′) [Athalye et al.,
2018]. In other words, an adversarial input would be one such that x is perturbed with a budget lower
than some small  such that it is classified incorrectly. Since it is not misclassified to some specific
y′, simply any class as long as it is not the correct label y, this is known as an untargeted attack.
Although targeted attacks are more powerful concerning the attack success rate, we are considering
an untargeted attack since these attacks are more effiecient (i.e., require a more limited perturbation
budget) [Kwon et al., 2018, Carlini and Wagner, 2017a]. This smaller perturbation budget allows for
an adversary to efficiently deploy the attack undetected [Carlini and Wagner, 2017a]. Therefore, it
is more beneficial to understand how these dimensionality reduction techniques impact a model’s
performance with harder to detect perturbations. For this work, we consider 0 <  ≤ 1.0 [Tjeng
et al., 2019].
In this paper, we use the l∞ distortion metric to measure the similarity between x and x′ since the
l∞-ball around x has recently been studied as an optimal, natural notion for adversarial perturbations
[Goodfellow et al., 2014, Carlini and Wagner, 2017a]. The l∞ distance is defined as l∞ = ‖x −
x′‖∞ = max(|x1 − x′1|, ..., |xn − x′n|). We can visualize the perturbation under this distance metric
by viewing a series of data points. There is a maximum perturbation budget of , where each value is
allowed to be changed by up to , with no limit on the number of modified values. Since D(x, x′)
has to remain less than some small , even if all values are modified, the trends will appear visually
identical.
Attack Method We generate adversarial samples using the iterative optimization-based method
of Carlini and Wagner [2017a]. The goal of the attack is to find some value γ by minimizing
D(x, x+ γ) + c · f(x+ γ) such that x+ γ ∈ [0, 1]n where D is the distance metric described above,
x is the input to be perturbed, f is an objective function such that C(x+ γ) 6= y, and c is a constant
value. To construct the samples, it completes 10,000 iterations of gradient descent with the Adam
optimizer for each of the 20 carefully chosen values of c. We selected this attack model due to its
high success at crafting effective adversarial samples with low distortion [Carlini and Wagner, 2017a,
Zantedeschi et al., 2017]. Specifically, we have used the Carlini & Wagner l∞ implementation from
the Adversarial Robustness Toolbox by IBM Research [Nicolae et al., 2018].
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Figure 3: Precision scores under-performed for all techniques once the perturbation budget was over
 = 0.68. From the scatter plot, we can see that reducing the number of features during training
negatively impacted the precision scores given a high enough perturbation budget.
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Figure 4: Attack success and log loss scores given five data transformation techniques against the
baseline model without pre-processing. We can see that the best performing technique was PCA using
half of the principal components. However, the log loss scores corresponding to model confident
shows the all PCA techniques returned the lowest confidence when  > 0.57.
5 Evaluating Robustness Against Evasion Attacks
5.1 Dataset and Model Setup
Recent state-of-the-art works are focused on image recognition tasks which results in evaluations
being done on the same datasets, MNIST and CIFAR, most of the time. However, as described in
Section 3.2, there are many high dimensional spaces in time series data that have received little
attention in the adversarial machine learning field. Therefore, the need for evaluation on other datasets
is crucial for the advancement of the area [Carlini and Wagner, 2017b]. As a result, for this work,
we have used the MHealth (Mobile Health) Dataset6 which contains body motion and vital signs
recording of individuals while performing several physical activities [Banos et al., 2015]. This highly
volatile dataset contains 22 total features which map to one of 12 potential physical activities and we
selected the data corresponding to subject1 with a total of 160,860 rows, or values of x. For the
classifier C described in Section 3.1, we have implemented a recurrent neural network with LSTM
layers. Network architecture and hyperparameter tuning were completed to guarantee that all trained
models received the same hyperparameters while maintaining testing accuracy above 90% to ensure
that robustness results were not impacted by the network architecture. Further details regarding
the data when compared against MNIST and CIFAR-10 can be found in Appendix B. The network
architecture and implementation details are provided in Appendix A.
5.2 Discussion
Feinman et al. [2017] established that adversarial samples lie furthest away from the data manifold,
and Goodfellow et al. [2014] established that adversarial perturbations on a sample x are created
6Dataset available on the UCI Machine Learning Repository at https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/
datasets/MHEALTH+Dataset
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as a gradient-based optimization problem. We also know that at the time of training, the weights
correspond to a decision axis which captures an optimal boundary between the data manifolds and
adversarial perturbations are restricted in the direction normal to the data manifold [Khoury and
Hadfield-Menell, 2018]. From evaluation of the dataset, the intrinsic dimension di is approximated to
be around 9 features of the 22 features based on the variance of the model [Van Der Maaten et al.,
2009]. These are the main facts that we build on for our discussion.
Manifold Impacts on Confidence and Precision From Figure 3, we can see that precision is
consistently below baseline for both feature selection and trend extraction techniques. The low log
loss and precision indicates that these models are overly confident but erroneous due to the closer
proximity between submanifolds to the decision axis. However, with PCA the precision is improved
when  < 0.65 due to better defined submanifolds as a direct result of mapping the input embedding
into a lower dimension. The reduced precision is then introduced when the log loss of the model
increases because linear units can get low precision from responding too strongly from a reduced
confidence when it does not understand samples with larger perturbations [Goodfellow et al., 2014].
Manifold Impacts on Accuracy From Figure 4, it is clear the attack success rate is only hindered
by 24.39% when the PCA technique is used with half of its principal components. Bhagoji et al.
[2018] proposed that PCA should increase robustness because PCA removing the high variance
components should eliminate the features that adversaries can easily take advantage of. However,
as Carlini and Wagner [2017b], already showed this is not consistent given a convolutional neural
network and it seems it is also not consistent with our recurrent neural network. This is only consistent
in the case when the input embedding dimensionality approaches the intrinsic dimensionality. Given
the intrinsic dimensionality reached with PCA 50%, the codimension is minimized resulting in the
most restricted number of directions for the adversary to take advantage.
The other PCA techniques using 27% and 81% of the principal components did not perform as
well once the perturbation budget exceeded  = 0.1. Particularly, using only 27% of the principal
components results losing too many dimensions which can in turn reduce the manifold coverage for
the dataset. The lack of coverage makes it is much easier for an adversary to find an example far
away from the data manifold [Feinman et al., 2017]. This can happen easily in practice since high
training/testing accuracy does not imply high accuracy/coverage of the data manifold [Khoury and
Hadfield-Menell, 2018]. On the contrary, when using 81% of the principal components, there is high
codimension resulting in relatively more directions normal to the manifold and directly contributing
to a more efficient attack.
The feature selection techniques behaved similarly as expected given both techniques selected a
majority of the same features. The lack of mapping to a lower dimension prevented the feature
selection techniques to approximate the intrinsic dimension as well as PCA. In both cases, since no
mapping occurs and a majority of the features are removed, the model contains high codimension
and a lack of manifold coverage relative to the component-based techniques. As a result, feature
selection allows for an efficient adversarial attack through all tested perturbation budgets. However,
since random forest selection closer approximates the intrinsic dimension, the attack success rate
differs to low variance selection by approximately 10%.
The trend extraction techniques, however, do not remove the features used but manage to force the
data into a lower dimensional manifold. For the candlesticks, the transformation into the 4-tuple
strayed the away from the intrinsic dimensionality by reshaping the features. This transformation
contributed in fundamental information loss for the dataset while straying away from the intrinsic
dimension resulting on the higher relative end of codimension and the one of most efficient creation of
adversarial examples with a 60.98% decrease in robustness at  = 1.0. However, EMA seemed to not
smooth the manifold enough for a drastic change from the baseline data. Therefore, no statistically
significant change to the intrinsic dimension or the data manifold results in a performance on par
with baseline. Table 1 shows a summary of the results.
6 Conclusion
For this work, we have shown the direct impacts that linear dimensionality reduction techniques
have on the creation of adversarial samples and robustness of a model based on transformations to
the data manifold. Overall, the component-based technique overperformed when the dimensionality
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Table 1: Summary of results: Shows the number of features used from the original data, its clean
accuracy when the model is not under attack, the perturbation budget required to attack success to
30%, and change in robustness at  = 0.80 relative to the baseline model with no data transformation
applied to its training data.
Data Transformation Feature Count Benign Accuracy Distance (l∞) ∆ in Robustness
Baseline 22 97.93% 0.51 -
PCA 11 96.71% 0.40 ↑ 24.39%
PCA 18 98.80% 0.76 ↓ 43.90%
PCA 6 95.00% 0.34 ↓ 60.98%
Random Forest 9 96.11% 0.13 ↓ 31.71%
Low Variance 11 91.32% 0.15 ↓ 65.85%
Candlesticks 22 92.78% 0.11 ↓ 60.98%
EMA 22 96.48% 0.51 ↓ 7.32%
approached the intrinsic dimension. Although this number of principal components was not the
identified intrinsic dimension, the direct mapping onto a lower dimension still allowed for a closer
approximation when compared to the feature selection techniques, such as random forest. Meanwhile,
the trend extraction techniques that refrained from sufficiently reaching the intrinsic dimension
showed to not only negatively impact the attack success but also the precision scores. Therefore,
future learning models under attack would benefit from using component-based techniques instead of
feature selection or trend extraction techniques only if they approximate the intrinsic dimension.
Broader Impact
In our work, we have only considered a recurrent neural network with LSTM layers. However,
we believe that the benefits presented by the intrinsic dimension can be extended to other network
architectures due to adversarial samples’ known generalized properties against data manifolds
[Feinman et al., 2017, Khoury and Hadfield-Menell, 2018] and the similar vulnerabilties throughout
machine learning models [Goodfellow et al., 2014, Bhagoji et al., 2018]. We also considered linear
data transformation techniques that are widely used in practice, not for robustness, to bring awareness
to those creating models of the negative impact that some pre-processing steps can contribute to their
model.
We have shown that an adversary’s ability to craft malicious samples can be positively and negatively
affected by widely-used data transformations on the input data. Positive impacts by dimensionality
reduction techniques are only presented where technique embeds the high-dimensional input space
into a low-dimensional structure that approaches the intrinsic dimension of data. Ilyas et al. [2019]
recently proposed that adversarial samples’ vulnerability is due to the well-generalizability of the
features. However, as the dimension approaches the optimal intrinsic dimension, lower codimension
and higher manifold coverage are resulting in a lesser need to generalize features. This conclusion
can contribute to the understanding and creation of more resistant learning models.
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A Network Architecture and Implementation Details
In this paper, we conducted the evaluation using a fully-connected recurrent neural network (RNN)
used to explore the impact of the Carlini and Wagner l∞ evasion attack on time series data. As
previously described, hyperparameters were optimally selected before the training began through a
grid search. These parameters were chosen to maintain the model accuracy of all models above 90%
to ensure the selected parameters did not impact robustness results.
For the network architecture, five total layers were employed: an input layer, three hidden layers, and
an output layer. The input layer takes as input a data tuple containing a sequence of features. This
sequence is used for the RNN to learn over consecutive data values, maintaining the time-dependent
relationship of the dataset. The sequence length used in this work was 100 for all models, except for
the models with the trend extraction data transformation techniques with a sequence length of 5 due
to their window size of 20. The output layer contains a dense layer with the final activation function,
softmax. We used the softmax function to calculate the output probability vector y to guarantee
that it satisfies ∀i ∈ N, 0 ≤ yi ≤ 1 and y1 + y2 + · · ·+ yN = 1 where N was the total number of
possible feature labels. The hidden state vectors, or hidden layers, contain only two LSTM units
combined with dropout layers as it has been shown that at least two hidden state vectors in RNNs
return satisfactory results, and more than three do not provide significant improvement [Karpathy
et al., 2015]. In these hidden vectors, we used the hyperbolic tangent function as it is the standard
activation function among recurrent neural networks [Chollet et al., 2015], and the dropout values
were set to 0.1 implying that 10% of each input was ignored in order to prevent the model from
overfitting to the training data.
Overall, since our goal was to explore the vulnerabilities in RNNs that are frequently used in various
applications, we kept our network architecture closer to the default models (provided by Keras
[Chollet et al., 2015]) as possible as long as we maintained a high enough accuracy across all
dimensionality reduction techniques. We are not concerned about the simple linear structure of our
network as Carlini and Wagner [2017a] claimed their attacks are not impacted by the simple structure
in the network architecture. Lastly, the attack hyperparameters used for the Carlini and Wagner l∞
implementation from the Adversarial Robustness Toolbox by IBM Research [Nicolae et al., 2018]
are shown in Table 2, as well. The models were all trained on an NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1060 with
Max-Q Design.
Table 2: Model parameters for all data transformation techniques where all techniques reached a
training accuracy of at least 90%.
Parameters Standard Training Adversarial Training
Confidence - 0.5
Learning rate 0.001 0.01
Dropout 0.1 -
Batch size 512 512
Epochs 250 -
For the implementation, we utilized Keras [Chollet et al., 2015], the API that integrates the lower-level
deep learning languages such as TensorFlow. Keras is used to facilitate the process of using deep
learning models in practice and has been increasingly used in industry and the research community
[Chollet et al., 2015]. We used the default learning rate hyperparameter of 0.001. The dataset used
was divided where 85% of the data was used for training, and 15% was used for testing. Due to the
various data transformation techniques, the specific shape of the data used for training and testing are
depicted in Table 3.
B Dataset Comparison Against MNIST and CIFAR-10
The focus of today’s adversarial evaluation is largely centered around image recognition tasks,
specifically using the MNIST [LeCun et al., 2010] and CIPAR-10 [Krizhevsky, 2009] datasets.
However, the time series data area contains various high dimensional datasets that have received little
attention yet are highly used throughout applications, as described in Section 3 when discussing the
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Table 3: Training and testing set dimensions used for evaluation with varying data transformation
techniques. The sequence length is 5 for the trend extraction techniques due to the time window of
size c = 20.
Data Transformation Training shape (X) Testing shape (X)
Baseline (136646, 100, 22) (24114, 100, 22)
PCA (p = 11) (136646, 100, 11) (24114, 100, 12)
PCA (p = 18) (136646, 100, 18) (24114, 100, 18)
PCA (p = 6) (136646, 100, 6) (24114, 100, 6)
Random Forest (136646, 100, 9) (24114, 100, 11)
Low Variance (136646, 100, 11) (24114, 100, 11)
Candlesticks (6831, 5, 115) (1206, 5, 115)
EMA (136726, 5, 22) (24129, 5, 22)
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(c) CIFAR-10 Dataset
Figure 5: Visualization of datasets using T-SNE to observe the relationships between the points in
high-dimensional space using 1000 randomly selected points from each dataset.
trend extraction techniques. As described in Section 5.1, for this work, we have used the MHealth
(Mobile Health) Dataset for our time series evaluation.
From Figure 5b, we can see that the MNIST dataset contains the best well-defined classes where
points corresponding to the same class are clustered together. This implies that the points within each
class of the MNIST dataset have highly correlated relationships even with the highly-dimensional
dataset. On the contrary, in Figure 5c, the CIFAR-10 dataset does not have well-defined clusters
resulting an almost opposite conclusion relative to the MNIST dataset. As a result, CIFAR-10 has
been described as a substantially more difficult dataset to work with and therefore, MNIST may
contain properties that do not generalize across tougher datasets such as CIFAR-10 [Carlini and
Wagner, 2017b].
(a) MHealth Dataset (b) MNIST Dataset (c) CIFAR-10 Dataset
Figure 6: Pearson correlation similarities between features in each dataset. The average Pearson
correlation values are 0.0697, 0.0192, and 0.2506 for MHealth, MNIST, and CIFAR-10, respectively.
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The MHealth dataset, however, lies between the MNIST and CIFAR-10 dataset in regards to the
relationship between the points in high-dimensional space. From the Figure 5a, we can see that there
are various clusters that can be easily identified, such as the points in class 1, 2, and 3. Yet, there are
cases such as with the points in class 8 and 12, where the points are more scattered. Additionally,
from Figure 6, we can see that the MNIST dataset is also the most similar between individual features
when compared against MHealth and the CIPHAR-10 datasets. As a result, we are evaluating with a
medical data dataset that is not only a realistic real time series dataset, but also contains manifold
properties that may carry-out to various other highly-dimensional time series datasets. As a result,
we believe our evaluation on the MHealth dataset is sufficient for the concluding results in this work.
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